I think it's time to officially declare Noli Me Tangere dead for now. Life is fluid, and Lazarus rose again, so who can say what the future holds for Mr. Tangere? But for the immediate future, (at least until after this), this space will be on indefinite hiatus.
One of my goals when I started this blog was to make myself seem witty and cool. The other goal was to keep you updated on various Asian religious cults. Keeping in line with the latter, please enjoy the guest blog below, submitted by special agent Philip Autry (code name: Guthrie). If anyone else wants to submit a guest blog, please send it in and I'll post it.
In the meantime, keep an eye peeled for more stories and updates, and I'll see you around. Thanks for checking in.
THREAT ASSESSMENT: Aleph (the cult formerly known as Aum Shinrikyo)
Summary
Aleph (formerly known as Aum Shinrikyo), the Japanese cult behind the March 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system, should continue to be regarded as a potentially serious threat. Despite changes in leadership and a decline in numerical strength in the last several years, Aleph retains aims and capabilities that, when considered alongside its background and leadership, warrant very close government scrutiny.
Background
Aum Shinrikyo was established in Japan in 1987 by Shoko Asahara. The cult achieved government recognition as a religious organization in Japan in 1989. After a failed run for the Diet in 1990, Asahara and his followers began to closely adhere to apocalyptic beliefs. The State Department’s 2004 Terrorism Report states that Aum “aimed to take over Japan and then the world.” Asahara predicted a coming nuclear holocaust involving the United States and Japan, and Aum launched aggressive efforts to acquire capabilities in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Engineers were recruited from Japan and from abroad to assist in this effort. Aum actively sought (but ultimately failed) to purchase nuclear weapons from Russia. After deciding in the early 1990s that the purchase of a nuclear weapon would not be possible, Aum decided instead to try to build its own. The extent of Aum’s pre-March 1995 WMD program became clear in the years following the Tokyo subway attack. In a 2000 raid of Aum facilities, Japanese police found classified information about nuclear facilities in Russia, Ukraine, China, South Korea, and Taiwan: Aum had broken into classified computer networks to obtain data about various foreign nuclear facilities. The group had also explored the possibility of mining uranium ore in Australia. When Aum decided that the construction of a nuclear weapon posed insurmountable technical challenges, they decided to use Aum’s substantial financial resources to acquire chemical weapons.
In the aftermath of the 1995 Tokyo attack, authorities uncovered much more information regarding Aum’s criminal activities, efforts, and intentions. The cult had been responsible for the seven gassing deaths in Matsumoto, Japan in 1994; two cult opponents had been attacked with VX nerve gas in 1994 and 1995; Aum had purchased an MI-17 military helicopter from Russia in 1994 and a sheep ranch in Australia in 1993.
Post-1995 Changes
A crackdown in the months and years after the Tokyo attack has resulted in substantial changes within Aum. Aum has experienced a significant decline in its number of followers. At the time of the subway attack in 1995, Aum claimed to have 9,000 members in Japan and 40,000 worldwide. The State Department puts Aum’s April 2005 membership at 1,650 persons. A 2004 profile of the cult in the Japan Times paints an even bleaker picture of Aum’s membership decline. The paper cites Aum’s 2004 report to Japan’s Public Security Investigation Agency: from a 1995 level of 10,000 lay followers and 1,000 commune residents, membership levels by 2003 had fallen to 735 lay followers and 578 commune residents. A drop in new recruits had the effect of pushing the average age of Aum members from the mid-20s to the late-30s.
The cult has seen significant leadership changes since 1995, as many of its former leaders were prosecuted and imprisoned in the wake of the Tokyo subway attack. Shoko Asahara, arrested shortly after the attacks, was convicted and sentenced to death in 2004. Noted Aum spokesman (and former head of Aum’s Russian operations) Fumihiro Joyu served a three-year prison sentence and became the leader of Aum after his release in late 1999. Under Joyu’s leadership, Aum made efforts to change course organizationally and in the public eye. The cult changed its name to Aleph, publicly acknowledged and apologized for the Tokyo attack, and Joyu moved to cut any remaining ties Aum had to Asahara. A special law enacted in Japan in 1999 granted the Public Security Intelligence Agency the authority to maintain close surveillance on Aum’s activities. In 2003, Japan’s Public Security Investigation Agency extended surveillance of Aum for an additional three years.
Post-1995 Continuities
Despite the reduction in numerical strength and the removal or imprisonment of many former leaders, a profile of Aum today displays disturbing continuities in aims and leadership with the cult that inflicted mass paranoia, sickness, and death in 1995. Since 1997, when Japan decided not to outlaw the cult, Aum has continued to recruit new members, engage in commercial enterprise, and acquire property. A public outcry in 2001 did result in a scaling down of these activities, but they nevertheless continue. In July 2001, Russian police uncovered a plot by Russian Aum followers to set off bombs in Tokyo, free Asahara from prison, and smuggle him to Russia. The State Department reports that the cult’s overseas operations survive: a branch comprising 300 followers has recently surfaced in Russia. Perhaps more alarming are recent leadership changes within the cult. In late 2003, Fumihiro Joyu stepped down from leadership of Aum. Joyu and Aum publicly portrayed the reasons for his resignation as health-related, but it appears that Joyu was actually forced to step down in an internal power struggle, as many senior Aum members had grown frustrated with his moves to distance Aum from Asahara. This recent change in leadership thus implies that Asahara- despite his arrest, trial, and death sentence- is still respected and highly regarded by influential Aum leaders, and questions about his legacy are divisive issues in the cult today.
Thus, due to questions regarding the potentially threatening nature of Aum’s current aims and activities, and due to the new leadership’s allegiance to the convicted mastermind of the 1995 Tokyo attack, Aum should continue to be regarded as a serious threat.
Sources
“Country Reports on Terrorism 2004”, US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2005.
Daly, Sara, John Parchini, and William Rosenau, “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism”, RAND Corporation, 2005.
Matsubara, Hiroshi, “Aum’s Organization Just a Shell of Its Old Flush Self”, The Japan Times, February 26, 2004.